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The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on 
International Antitrust 
Anu Bradford ,† Adam S. Chilton,†† & Filippo Maria Lancieri‡ 
Beginning in the 1950s, a group of scholars primarily associated with the Uni-
versity of Chicago began to challenge many of the fundamental tenants of antitrust 
law. This movement, which became known as the Chicago School of Antitrust Analy-
sis, profoundly altered the course of American antitrust scholarship, regulation, and 
enforcement. What is not known, however, is the degree to which Chicago School 
ideas influenced the antitrust regimes of other countries. By leveraging new datasets 
on antitrust laws and enforcement around the world, we empirically explore whether 
ideas embraced by the Chicago School diffused internationally. Our analysis illus-
trates that many ideas explicitly rejected by the Chicago School—such as using an-
titrust law to promote goals beyond efficiency or regulate unilateral conduct—are 
common features of antitrust regimes in other countries. We also provide suggestive 
evidence that the influence of the antitrust revolution launched by the Chicago 
School has been more limited outside of the United States. 
INTRODUCTION 
The rise of law and economics introduced profound changes 
in a wide range of legal fields. In few fields, however, did the 
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movement have a more profound effect than in antitrust. The law 
and economics movement led antitrust law and scholarship in the 
United States to become increasingly informed by economic theo-
ries. Formalistic per se rules that used to characterize US anti-
trust doctrine gave way to a case-by-case assessment of the eco-
nomic effects of firm conduct. As a result, antitrust enforcement 
increasingly began to rely on economic experts, theoretical mod-
els, and econometrics studies that are now all but mandatory in 
antitrust litigation.1 
This shift in US antitrust policy marked the triumph of ideas 
championed by scholars associated with the University of Chicago.2 
The “Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis”3 (Chicago School) used 
rigorous microeconometric analysis to change antitrust enforcers’ 
focus from economic power to economic incentives.4 This new fo-
cus, combined with a more conservative judiciary, led to a gradual 
reversal of many previously established antitrust doctrines5—
from the prosecution of vertical mergers6 to the per se treatment 
of several forms of unilateral conduct.7 Although antitrust schol-
ars may disagree on the appropriateness of the Chicago School 
 
 1 See Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Gen-
eralist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 
J Law & Econ 1, 6, 8 (2011) (conducting a survey of 714 antitrust cases in federal and 
administrative courts and finding that, collectively, the cases mentioned the terms “expert 
reports” 332 times, “statistics” 290 times, “expert witnesses” 230 times, and “regression” 
113 times). See also Patrick R. Ward, Comment, Testing for Multisided Platform Effects 
in Antitrust Market Definition, 84 U Chi L Rev 2059, 2070–71 (2017) (commenting on the 
rise of complex economic arguments in market definition). 
 2 See, for example, Andrew I. Gavil, William E. Kovacic, and Jonathan B. Baker, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts, and Problems in Competition Policy 66–67 
(West 2d ed 2008) (noting how the Chicago School “altered the terms of antitrust debate” 
to include price theory and concepts such as market power, entry, and efficiency). 
 3 See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 
925, 925–26 (1979). 
 4 Filippo Maria Lancieri, Digital Protectionism? Antitrust, Data Protection, and the 
EU/US Transatlantic Rift, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement 27, 33 (2019). 
 5 See id. 
 6 An example of a vertical merger challenge is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States, 370 US 294 (1962). In that case, the Court enjoined 
a merger in which the combined vertical market share of both companies did not reach 
10 percent of the national market, and, as evidence of potential anticompetitive harm, the 
Court noted that in 118 cities the combined horizontal market share of companies ex-
ceeded 5 percent. Id at 327, 343. See also Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Eval-
uating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 Antitrust L J 513, 513–14 (1995) 
(discussing how the Chicago School’s critique of Brown Shoe and other challenges to ver-
tical mergers led to a more permissive policy). 
 7 See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977); State 
Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 18 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 
551 US 877, 907 (2007) (reversing per se policies that had been in force for decades). See 
2020] The Chicago School’s Limited Influence 299 
 
ideas, few would question the profound influence those ideas have 
had on US antitrust policy. 
An open question remains, however, whether the Chicago 
School has influenced the antitrust policies of other countries. An-
ecdotal examples indicate a complex picture. For instance, several 
countries recognize an efficiency defense—that is, justifications 
used to approve an otherwise anticompetitive merger because of 
the various efficiencies the merger is expected to generate—in as-
sessing the competitive effects of mergers.8 This practice is very 
much in line with the Chicago School’s ideas. But at the same 
time, enforcement against unilateral conduct of dominant firms 
remains vigorous in many jurisdictions (at least when compared 
to the United States), including the European Union.9 This prac-
tice is in tension with the Chicago School view that unilateral con-
duct rarely calls for an antitrust intervention.10 Moreover, Chicago 
scholars also strongly condemned the use of antitrust laws for re-
distributive ends or the promotion of industrial policy. For them, 
it would be disconcerting to learn that several countries list the 
promotion of employment or of national industries as a goal of 
antitrust laws or evaluate mergers based on whether they ad-
vance the “public interest.” 
In this Essay, we seek to go beyond these anecdotes and em-
pirically measure the Chicago School’s international influence. To 
do so, we leverage two recently created datasets on antitrust re-
gimes around the world.11 The first—the Comparative Competi-
tion Law Dataset—provides detailed coding on the provisions of 
the antitrust statutes of 131 jurisdictions from their first adoption 
through 2010. The second—the Comparative Competition En-
forcement Dataset—provides data on the enforcement resources 
 
also Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984) (upholding the 
per se rule against tying, but nonetheless limiting courts’ ability to find such conduct ille-
gal in the absence of market power). 
 8 See Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Competition Law Around the World from 
1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index, 14 J Competition L & Econ 393, 410 (2018) 
(noting that as of 2010, at least forty-five countries had an efficiency defense). 
 9 See, for example, Google Search (Shopping), ECComm 1 (AT.39740) (June 27, 
2017) (finding that Google infringed on EU antitrust rules by displaying its own shopping 
service more favorably than competing shopping services in its search results); Antitrust: 
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile De-
vices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s Search Engine (European Commission, July 18, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/2955-H28S. 
 10 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3). 
 11 See Anu Bradford, et al, Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative 
Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud 411, 412–13 (2019). 
See also Bradford and Chilton, 14 J Competition L & Econ at 394–95 (cited in note 8). 
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and activities of 112 antitrust agencies between 1990 and 2010. 
Together, these datasets provide a detailed picture of the world’s 
antitrust regimes across countries and over time. 
As these data illustrate, since the Chicago School’s antitrust 
revolution, the number of countries with antitrust regimes has 
soared. Figure 1 shows that in 1979, at the end of the period when 
the Chicago School’s most prominent intellectual contributions 
were made,12 just 41 countries had an antitrust regime in place.13 
But by 2010, 127 countries had adopted an antitrust regime.14 
Our data thus allow us to examine whether these 86 antitrust 
regimes that were adopted after the Chicago School’s prominence 
in the US incorporate the insights of the Chicago School into their 
regime, and also whether the countries that already had antitrust 
regimes amended their laws to reflect Chicago School theories. 
 
 12 See Part I.A for an explanation of why we designate this window as the height of 
the Chicago School. 
 13 Data on file with authors. 
 14 Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 412 (cited in note 11). 
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FIGURE 1: COUNTRIES WITH ANTITRUST STATUTES, 1900 TO 2010 
We specifically use these datasets to examine the influence of 
the Chicago School in three areas. First, we examine the goals 
and exemptions that countries have codified in their antitrust 
statutes. This analysis reveals that many countries have explic-
itly endorsed ideas in their antitrust laws that are antithetical to 
Chicago School theories. For instance, by 2010, 50 percent of 
countries with antitrust regimes had explicitly codified goals in 
their antitrust laws unrelated to efficiency—including the protec-
tion of small companies or promotion of exports.15 Second, we ex-
amine the provisions of countries’ antitrust regimes that regulate 
unilateral conduct. These data reveal that a majority of countries 
with antitrust regimes prohibited several kinds of conduct that 
Chicago School scholars had argued were unlikely to reduce com-
petition. For instance, in 2010, 63 percent of countries with anti-
trust regimes prohibited unfair pricing. Moreover, in 2010, there 
were more investigations opened around the world into abuses of 
dominance than into cartels. Third, we examine merger review 
policies globally. Again, this analysis illustrates that many coun-
tries with merger review regimes have laws that incorporate 
ideas that were rejected by the Chicago School. For example, by 
 
 15 See Figure 3.  
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2010, 42 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had merger 
defenses unrelated to efficiency—including the promotion of gen-
eral “public interest.” 
That said, from the outset, it is important to acknowledge that 
there are several reasons why the global influence of the Chicago 
School is difficult to quantify.16 First, the Chicago School’s ideas 
are perhaps best understood as a commitment to a certain method 
of antitrust enforcement rather than an agreement on specific 
policy outcomes. This analytical method—including the general 
endorsement of an effects-based analysis of competitive conduct—
may not always have been codified in antitrust laws the way a 
clear rule or policy prescription would be, making it difficult to 
detect. Second, the ideas associated with the Chicago School are 
not always easy to theoretically or empirically separate from 
other schools of thought that endorse economic analysis of anti-
trust laws.17 As a result, our evidence may be best understood as 
capturing the diffusion of economic analysis of antitrust laws gen-
erally as opposed to the diffusion of the Chicago School ideas spe-
cifically. Finally, the primary data we use to study the influence 
of the Chicago School are based on countries’ antitrust statutes, 
which do not always reflect how laws are enforced in practice. 
These limitations may lead us to either under- or overestimate 
the extent of Chicago School’s global influence. 
Given these limitations, we are unlikely to settle the debate 
on the Chicago School’s contribution to international antitrust. 
But we hope that our results paint a more nuanced view of the 
Chicago School’s thrust than currently exists. Specifically, we 
hope to shed light on whether the Chicago School remained 
largely a US phenomenon, with a limited ability to shape anti-
trust thinking abroad, or whether its ideas diffused more broadly. 
We also hope that our results help enlighten the ongoing debate 
on the potential need to reassess antitrust enforcement, and the 
Chicago School, in the United States and beyond. 
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the Chicago 
School’s main ideas. Part II discusses existing evidence on the in-
ternational influence of the Chicago School and the difficulties 
that arise when trying to empirically measure this influence. 
Part III describes our data and empirical findings. 
 
 16 Part II.C more extensively discusses the limitations of our approach. 
 17 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 933–44 (cited in note 3) (discussing the convergence 
between the Chicago and Harvard schools of thought). 
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I.  THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF ANTITRUST 
A. Background 
The so-called Chicago School is the result of decades of aca-
demic scholarship on antitrust law and policy by professors asso-
ciated with the economics and law departments of the University 
of Chicago. While it is hard to pinpoint an exact beginning and 
end, the Chicago School is said to have started forming around 
the 1950s, reflecting the teaching and influence of the University 
of Chicago law professor Aaron Director and the ideas developed 
by his students and colleagues, including Professors George 
Stigler, Harold Demsetz, Ward Bowman, John McGee, and Lester 
Telser, and Judges Robert Bork, Richard Posner, and Frank 
Easterbrook.18 More than articulating a cohesive theory on anti-
trust policy, Director instigated his peers to use microeconomics 
and price theory to challenge what were, at the time, key anti-
trust doctrines related to tie-ins, predatory pricing, and vertical 
conduct such as resale price maintenance and exclusive dealing.19 
The Chicago School advocated that scholars and courts should fo-
cus on the incentives of economic agents and not on the structure 
of the market to determine the competitive effects of mergers and 
firm conduct.20 This view directly challenged the more structural-
ist approach associated with the so-called Harvard School, which 
was concerned with market concentration.21 By doing so, the Chi-
cago School promoted a more benign view of corporate conduct, 
one that warranted less antitrust intervention based on a belief 
that markets would largely self-correct while governmental inter-
vention could entrench monopolies.22 
The Chicago School’s influence peaked in the 1970s and 
1980s.23 The enactment of new federal Merger Guidelines, which 
 
 18 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 925–26 (cited in note 3); Andrew I. Gavil, et al, 
Antitrust Law in Perspective: Cases, Concepts and Problems in Competition Policy 71 
(West 3d ed 2017). 
 19 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3); Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in 
Perspective at 72 (cited in note 18); A. Douglas Melamed, et al, Antitrust Law and Trade 
Regulation: Cases and Materials 52–53 (Foundation 7th ed 2018). 
 20 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich L Rev 
1696, 1698 (1986). 
 21 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 70–73 (cited in note 18) (discussing 
the shift from a structuralist view to an incentives view). 
 22 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 133 (Basic Books 1978). 
 23 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75 (cited in note 18). 
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largely reflected the teachings of Chicago School scholars, 
demonstrated their profound impact on administrative agencies 
tasked with enforcing antitrust laws.24 At the same time, a more 
conservative US judiciary also started to incorporate Chicago 
School ideas into US case law by reverting or qualifying im-
portant antitrust doctrines, such as those around intrabrand ver-
tical restraints or tying.25 
The Chicago School’s influence in the United States started 
to gradually wane around the 1990s and 2000s, at least in aca-
demia.26 Around that time, other scholars began to combine the 
Chicago School’s own methodological foundations with a more in-
depth use of game theory to challenge, or at least qualify, some of 
its basic tenets, including rationales for market exclusion and the 
Single Monopoly Profit Theorem.27 This criticism of the Chicago 
School ideas gave birth to what some have called the post–Chicago 
School, which combines industrial organization, game theory, and 
empirical tools to measure the extent to which firms compete with 
one another.28 
 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Continental Television, Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 57 (1977); 
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 12–18 (1984). See also generally 
Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 330 (1979). Other important cases focused on how to define 
antitrust harm and predatory pricing, and other topics that were also impacted by the 
work of Harvard scholars like Professors Areeda and Turner. See William E. Kovacic, The 
Intellectual DNA of Modern US Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The  
Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev 1, 46–47. These scholars warned 
of the dangers of overenforcement of antitrust laws by private litigators. See id at 51–54. 
See also Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc, 429 US 477, 487 (1977); Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 (1986); Brooke Group Ltd v 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 221–25, 227, 232–33, 238–39 (1993). 
 26 See Gavil, et al, Antitrust Law in Perspective at 75–77 (cited in note 18) (discussing 
the rise of the “post-Chicago” school). The Chicago School still had important wins in the 
judiciary, such as the cases around resale price maintenance. See State Oil Co v Khan, 522 
US 3, 18 (1997); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007). 
 27 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L J 209, 225–27 (1986); Einer 
Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 
123 Harv L Rev 397, 400 (2009); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle 
and Execution 38–39 (Harvard 2008). 
 28 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 Mich L Rev 213, 260–
64 (1985) (discussing how the Chicago School models did not consider appropriately real-
world problems and ignored many forms of strategic behavior). See also Gavil, et al, Anti-
trust Law in Perspective at 76 (cited in note 18). For a review on the problems of these 
“School” divisions, see Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 72–80 (cited in note 25). 
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B. The Chicago School Approach to Antitrust 
The Chicago School approach to antitrust is difficult to sum-
marize because there is variation in the ideas embraced by schol-
ars associated with the School.29 To simplify, we briefly explain 
the basic arguments of Judges Bork and Posner in three of their 
seminal works: Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, Posner’s Antitrust Law: 
An Economic Perspective, and Posner’s The Chicago School of An-
titrust Analysis.30 We choose to focus on the works of Bork and 
Posner not only because of their prominent role as judges who 
applied the Chicago School teachings to concrete antitrust cases, 
but also because of their tendency to articulate largely similar 
and comprehensive views on how the Chicago School should im-
pact antitrust policy.31 
According to the Chicago School, the main goal of antitrust 
was the promotion of consumer welfare, which Judge Bork under-
stood as general or total welfare.32 The Chicago School ignored 
“small-business welfare”33 and the protection of competition for 
competition’s sake.34 For instance, it decried the Robinson- 
Patman Act35 as an example of small-business antitrust that rep-
resented unsound redistributive antitrust policy.36 More broadly, 
antitrust policy should not concern itself with redistributing sur-
plus between consumers and firms or among different firms. This 
 
 29 Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3). See also Einer Elhauge, Harvard, 
Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives Recent US Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 Com-
petition Pol Intl 59, 71–72 (2007) (distinguishing “Judge Posner’s Chicago School view” 
from “Judge Easterbrook’s Chicago School position”); Bruce H. Kobayashi and Timothy J. 
Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 Anti-
trust L J 147, 154 (2012) (discussing the “many disagreements regarding the appropriate 
scope of policy among Chicago School scholars”). 
 30  See generally Bork, Antitrust Paradox (cited in note 22); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust 
Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago 1976); Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev 925 (cited in note 3). 
 31 It is important to acknowledge that Judges Bork and Posner did disagree on im-
portant topics, such as how to characterize predatory pricing or the dangers of parallel 
conduct. See note 101 and accompanying text. 
 32 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 7 (cited in note 22) (“[T]he only legitimate goal of anti-
trust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”). 
 33 Id at 17, 51. 
 34 See id at 58–61. 
 35 49 Stat 1526 (1936), codified as amended at 15 USC § 13. 
 36 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 64, 386 (cited in note 22). 
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type of redistribution is better left for private bargaining, mar-
kets, and Congress.37 Nor should antitrust policy be deployed for 
the pursuit of industrial policy. 
For Chicago School scholars, price theory is the proper lens 
to study the competitive behavior of firms.38 Courts should not in-
fer market power from market shares (save at very high concen-
tration levels), and should require parties to demonstrate the ex-
istence of market power and consumer harm in order to justify an 
antitrust intervention. Judge Bork in particular was against “incip-
iency” theories—that is, the proposition that courts are able to iden-
tify anticompetitive conduct before it takes place.39 The Chicago 
view was that false positives are costlier than false negatives be-
cause the market has strong incentives to self-correct, while spec-
ulative government intervention may lead to consumer harm and 
a waste of taxpayer money.40 
This enforcement philosophy led the Chicago School to advo-
cate a minimalist antitrust policy that focuses on egregious com-
petitive restraints that have no efficiency justification.41 The goal 
was to fight deadweight loss: in particular, output restrictions 
that raise consumer prices in an artificial manner.42 Antitrust en-
forcement should therefore focus on dismantling cartels and pre-
venting large horizontal mergers (that is, mergers between com-
petitors) that lead to inefficient monopolies or facilitate 
collusion.43 The Chicago School also warned against using the in-
tent to exclude competitors as a proxy for a competition violation, 
as all businesses have the intent to exclude their rivals,44 and ar-
gued that consumers would typically benefit from the exclusion of 
inefficient rivals.45 
The Chicago School’s antitrust minimalism was supported by 
the School’s resounding faith in efficient business conduct and 
self-correcting markets. The Chicago School promoted the view 
 
 37 See id at 55–56 (cited in note 22). Bork specifically rejects granting judges the 
power to define trade-offs in terms of winners or losers of economic surplus. Id at 80 
(“Striking the balance is essentially a legislative task.”). 
 38 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
117 (cited in note 22). 
 39 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 17, 48 (cited in note 22). 
 40 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox 
at 133 (cited in note 22). 
 41 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 133 (cited in note 22). 
 42 See id at 35, 122–23. 
 43 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928, 933 (cited in note 3). 
 44 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 39 (cited in note 22). 
 45 See id at 56. 
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that most corporate conduct was efficient, further justifying the 
narrow scope for government intervention. This view subse-
quently translated into an expanded use of the efficiency defense 
for all forms of mergers and unilateral conduct.46 Similarly, the 
Chicago School emphasized the ability of new entrants to disci-
pline most types of anticompetitive behavior. It thereby attacked 
an expansive view of barriers to entry in markets, arguing that 
such barriers are less common than conventionally envisioned.47 
The presumption that mergers generally lead to efficiencies 
lent support for a narrow merger regime limited to reviewing 
large, horizontal mergers.48 The Chicago School was not con-
cerned about simple increases in market shares (save at very high 
concentration levels).49 It also criticized American courts for ne-
glecting this efficiency justification, in particular the Supreme 
Court’s Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States50 and United States v 
Von’s Grocery Co51 decisions.52 The Chicago School scholars de-
fended vertical mergers as generally efficient, asserting that they 
rarely lead to foreclosure concerns.53 Similarly, conglomerate 
mergers were seen as typically efficient, warranting little anti-
trust intervention.54 
 
 46 See id at 19, 25–26, 88, 111. Here some clarification is needed. Antitrust initially 
included efficiency defenses, but the Brandeis Supreme Court movement largely set them 
aside. In addition, Judge Bork was initially against an efficiency defense in mergers as 
proposed in Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 Am Econ Rev 18, 33 (1968), arguing that courts would not be able to properly 
measure it. See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 111–12 (cited in note 22). For him, efficiency 
should be largely presumed as a result of mergers. See id. Nonetheless, we believe that 
Chicago School scholars were largely responsible for bringing discussions on the efficiency 
of mergers back to antitrust policy, similarly to what they have done to discussions around 
efficiency in many other areas. 
 47 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 310–29 (cited in note 22). In particular, the Chicago 
School argued that economies of scale, product differentiation, expenditures on advertis-
ing and promotion, rebates, and dealership deals and capital requirements in general do 
not constitute entry barriers. See id. 
 48 See id at 221, 231 (arguing that “[horizontal] mergers up to 60 or 70 percent of the 
market should be permitted” and that “there is no reason for the law to oppose [vertical] 
mergers”). 
 49 See id at 180–81. That is because many oligopolies were seen as actually competitive. 
 50 370 US 294 (1962). 
 51 384 US 270 (1966). 
 52 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 198–204 (cited in note 22) (attacking the decisions 
in Brown Shoe Co and Von’s Grocery Co). 
 53 See id at 227 (cited in note 22). Cases in which products are not consumed in fixed 
proportions may be exceptions, but even in those cases vertical mergers may increase ef-
ficiency by enabling price discrimination. 
 54 See id at 246. Conglomerate mergers are defined as any merger that is neither 
horizontal (fear of coordination) nor vertical (fear of foreclosure). 
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Chicago School scholars further believed that firms cannot 
generally obtain or enhance monopoly power through unilateral 
action. This is because, in most cases, firms would just preserve 
or gain market share at the expense of profits.55 In addition, anti-
trust law should not be concerned with attacking companies in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic industries when their size has been 
achieved by internal growth, as larger firms are normally more 
efficient than smaller ones.56 As previously noted, they also 
viewed oligopolies as largely competitive.57 Judge Bork goes as far 
as to say that exclusionary conduct by dominant firms is a class 
of illegal behavior that does not exist.58 For example, predatory 
pricing is generally procompetitive, as subsequent attempts to re-
coup losses from below-cost pricing will inevitably face new entry 
that erodes monopoly profits. Even if strategic behavior in specific 
circumstances could lead to predatory pricing, the high adminis-
trative costs of separating legitimate discounts from predatory 
pricing should prevent authorities from focusing enforcement on 
such conduct.59 Given the Chicago School’s benevolent view of uni-
lateral conduct, it resisted the idea of breaking up monopolies.60 
The Chicago School also viewed many other competition re-
strictions as efficiency enhancing. For example, intrabrand re-
straints were seen as generally procompetitive given their ten-
dency to spur interbrand competition.61 Similarly, price 
discrimination allowed the monopolist to serve additional consum-
ers and mitigate deadweight loss.62 The Chicago School also em-
phasized the efficiencies associated with maximum and minimum 
 
 55 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 928 (cited in note 3). 
 56 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 164, 178 (cited in note 22). 
 57 See id at 103–04, 180–81. 
 58 See id at 171. 
 59 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 939–40 (cited in note 3). 
 60 See id at 944–45; Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 178 (cited in note 22). The reason for 
opposing breakups as a remedy was twofold: either competition is feasible, in which case 
new entrants are more efficient than governments in transforming uncompetitive oligop-
olies into competitive markets; or markets are simply not competitive (for example, natu-
ral monopolies), in which case breaking up firms would lead to a loss of scale and ineffi-
ciencies. Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 944–45 (cited in note 3). 
 61 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 156–57 (cited in note 22). Interventions in these 
cases should be restricted to the few cases in which the market shares of the company 
involved are very high (approximately 80–90 percent) and there is proof of intent to harm 
competition. Id at 157. 
 62 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
240 (cited in note 22). 
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resale price maintenance,63 exclusive dealing and long-term con-
tracts,64 territorial restraints,65 conditional discounts,66 and tying.67 
II.  THE GLOBAL INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
As the above discussion illustrates, the Chicago School advo-
cated a much smaller role for antitrust enforcement than what 
existed at the time in the United States.68 But beyond the acknowl-
edgement of the gradual adoption of antitrust law and economics 
in the EU and a few other jurisdictions, there has been limited 
scholarship on the whether the Chicago School’s more minimalist 
approach—or what Judge Easterbrook called “workable” anti-
trust policy69—disseminated outside of America. In this Part, we 
first discuss what is known about the ways in which Chicago 
School ideas—and law and economics more generally—have 
shaped antitrust policies around the world. We then explain why 
the specific ideas associated with the Chicago School seem to have 
gained limited traction. Finally, we address the difficulty of em-
pirically testing the extent of the Chicago School’s influence. 
A. What We Know About the Influence of the Chicago School 
While a significant body of scholarship discusses the influ-
ence of the Chicago School on US antitrust law, we are unaware 
of any notable literature examining the influence of the Chicago 
School across the world. The existing scholarship recognizes the 
international influence of the law and economics movement in 
general, but it pays little attention to the role of the Chicago 
School in particular. While this literature suggests that law and 
economics has gained some traction outside the US, the influence 
of the Chicago School seems more tentative.70 Some commenta-
tors even suggest that outside the US, “the Chicago model has in 
 
 63 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
280–81 (cited in note 22). 
 64 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
309 (cited in note 22). 
 65 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 927 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
297–98 (cited in note 22). 
 66 See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 326 (cited in note 22). 
 67 See Posner, 127 U Pa L Rev at 926 (cited in note 3); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 
375 (cited in note 22). 
 68 See Kovacic, 2007 Colum Bus L Rev at 17–18, 21–22 (cited in note 25). 
 69 Easterbrook, 84 Mich L Rev at 1700–01 (cited in note 20). 
 70 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 Cardozo L Rev 367, 
401 (2009). 
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general been studied more for its pitfalls than for its accuracy and 
appropriateness.”71 But the Chicago School ideas may have dif-
fused selectively as part of some foreign jurisdictions’ willingness 
to embrace principles associated with law and economics. 
In particular, over the last two decades, the law and econom-
ics movement has become more influential in some parts of the 
world, even though foreign jurisdictions have embraced it more 
selectively and deployed its ideas with more caveats compared to 
the US.72 As a result, a growing number of antitrust jurisdictions 
“are creating, analyzing, and enforcing law with an eye toward its 
economic consequences, usually defined in terms of allocative 
efficiency.”73 For instance, the Small but Significant and Non-
transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test—an economic test used 
to identify the smallest relevant market within which a monopo-
list could profitably impose a significant increase in price—is now 
the most commonly used method for market definition across  
jurisdictions.74 
The evolution of EU antitrust law illustrates the growing in-
fluence of law and economics outside the United States. As of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has increasingly embraced 
economic analysis of antitrust law, including some aspects of the 
Chicago School.75 The goal of EU antitrust law has increasingly 
centered on consumer welfare:76 the broader goals that character-
ized the earlier decades of EU’s antitrust policy are no longer key 
 
 71 Mel Marquis, Idea Merchants and Paradigm Peddlers in Global Antitrust, 28 Pac 
McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J 155, 203 (2015). 
 72 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 401 (cited in note 70). 
 73 Id at 368. 
 74 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of Eco-
nomic Analysis in Competition Cases *8 (Apr 28, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/ 
YX8M-C6VN. 
 75 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Move-
ment in Europe, 17 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 5 (1997) (discussing the “rapid growth of the [law 
and economics] field in Europe”); Wolfgang Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC in 
Light of the “Economic Approach”, in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego, 
and Stefan Enchelmaier, eds, Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New En-
forcement Mechanisms? 1, 1–2 (Springer 2008) (noting that since the late 1990s, the Eu-
ropean Commission’s attempts to modernize EC competition law have been focused on “an 
increased role of economics in competition law,” with “strong emphasis [ ] placed on the 
promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare”). 
 76 See Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102 
TFEU 6 (Hart 2d ed 2013) (“[I]t is more than tolerably clear that consumer welfare is now 
the primary objective of EU competition law.”). The interpretation of consumer welfare in 
the EU diverges from the United States in important ways, in particular given the re-
quirements of Article 101(3) TFEU. See Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, 
2020] The Chicago School’s Limited Influence 311 
 
drivers of EU enforcement, even if some, such as market integra-
tion, remain important.77 Various European Commission enforce-
ment guidelines similarly emphasize the effects-based analysis 
and the central role of the efficiency defense.78 On mergers, the 
European Commission’s approach is similar to the United 
States’.79 On unilateral conduct, the Commission has abandoned 
its prior, overly formalistic analysis in favor of a more effects-
based analysis of anticompetitive behavior—even if the Commis-
sion continues to be criticized for falling short of the economic 
analysis endorsed in its own Article 102 guidelines, or deeming 
(almost) per se illegal certain types of conduct that are (almost) 
per se legal in the United States.80 
As evidence of this general shift toward greater acceptance of 
economic analysis of EU antitrust law, the former Director Gen-
eral of Competition for the European Commission, Philip Lowe, 
argued in a 2003 speech for the need for a “comprehensive reas-
sessment of practice under Article [102] in the light of economic 
thinking [because] [a] credible policy on abusive conduct must be 
compatible with mainstream economics.”81 Suggesting that the 
EU had learned from US doctrine, Lowe emphasized the need to 
focus on “economic analysis” and apply economic theory to exist-
ing case law.82 The shift in tone took place in merger review after 
the European Commission experienced a string of humiliating de-
feats before the European Court of Justice, which in 2002 over-
turned three of the Commission’s merger prohibitions at the ap-
peal stage in a close sequence, strongly criticizing the 
Commission’s inadequate economic assessment.83 This criticism 
prompted the Commission to reassess its antitrust policy, and 
 
and Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era *40 (EU 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8K4J-Q6BB. 
 77 See Wurmnest, The Reform of Article 82 EC at 17 (cited in note 75) (noting that 
an EU approach to competition law “places welfare considerations next to the traditional 
objectives, such as market integration”). 
 78 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 79–80, 225–26 (cited in note 76). 
 79 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 398 (cited in note 70). 
 80 See O’Donoghue and Padilla, Article 102 TFEU at 270 (cited in note 76); Alison 
Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 365 (Oxford 
6th ed 2016) (discussing the EU application of effects analysis in unilateral conduct). For 
a brief EU/US analysis, see Lancieri, 7 J Antitrust Enforcement at 34–36 (cited in note 4). 
 81 Philip Lowe, Speech Delivered by Philip Lowe at the Fordham Antitrust Conference 
in Washington *2 (Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Oct 23, 2003), archived at 
https://perma.cc/B3KN-LGZB. 
 82 Id at *3, 7. 
 83 See Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 397–98 (cited in note 70). 
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contributed to its greater willingness to embrace economic analy-
sis as a cornerstone of the EU’s antitrust enforcement. A 2009 
study by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) also documents the shift in EU antitrust policy, 
citing the recent reforms in EU antitrust law “from a form-based 
towards a more effects-based approach [as] an example of greater 
reliance on economic analysis.”84 In particular, the UNCTAD em-
phasizes the EU’s adoption of the SSNIP test for defining relevant 
markets in 1997, the revision of its rules on vertical and horizon-
tal restraints in 1999 and 2000, and its revised merger regula-
tions in 2004 and 2007.85 
Despite these developments, many key elements of EU anti-
trust law that are contrary to Chicago School principles have re-
mained intact. For example, the EU continues to challenge verti-
cal and conglomerate mergers contrary to the Chicago School’s 
teachings that emphasize these types of mergers’ procompetitive 
effects.86 In a similarly stark departure from the Chicago School 
ideas, vertical agreements that contain territorial restrictions or 
restrict the resale price of goods or services often lead to per se 
antitrust liability in the EU.87 Additionally, the EU treats exclu-
sionary conduct by dominant firms with suspicion and actively 
pursues these firms’ tying, discounting, exclusive dealing, as well 
as predatory, discriminatory, or unfair pricing practices.88 By con-
tinuing to subject such a broad range of conduct to antitrust scru-
tiny, the EU shows it has not relinquished its rather “maximalist” 
approach to antitrust, which is antithetical to the Chicago 
School’s antitrust minimalism. 
Some scholars have suggested that the way law professors 
and students are trained explains why law and economics takes 
hold in certain places. For example, Professor Spencer Weber 
Waller argues that law and economics became more influential in 
the EU as increasing “direct study and personal, professional, and 
 
 84 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Board, The Use of Eco-
nomic Analysis at *3 (cited in note 74). 
 85 See id at *3 n 3. 
 86 See Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 436 (cited in note 11). 
 87 See Ioannis Apostolakis, Resale Price Maintenance and Absolute Territorial Pro-
tection: Single Market Integration, the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine and the Application 
of Article 101 TFEU to Vertical Agreements, 38 World Competition 215, 215–17 (2015); 
Bhawna Gulati, Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Agreements: Economic & Commer-
cial Justifications, 9 Manchester J Intl Econ L 92, 95 (2012). 
 88 Waller, 31 Cardozo L Rev at 395 & nn 97–98 (cited in note 70). 
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academic contacts between the U.S. and E.U. competition com-
munities . . . inevitably expose[d] E.U. decision-makers to Chicago 
School jurisprudence.”89 Similarly, in Japan, law and economics 
became more prominent as young Japanese faculty were increas-
ingly completing at least part of their training in the United 
States.90 One empirical study attributed the popularity of law and 
economics in some countries, but not others, to different struc-
tural incentives in each academic community: in countries such 
as Israel, the Netherlands, and the United States, writing law 
and economics papers is viewed as more valuable when consider-
ing academic appointments and promotions, leading to greater in-
fluence of law and economics there in comparison to countries like 
Germany.91 
Frequent interactions among antitrust enforcers have also 
contributed to the dissemination of economic theories. The US 
and the EU antitrust agencies have concluded several bilateral 
cooperation agreements with their foreign counterparts.92 These 
formalized channels of interaction, together with cooperation on 
technical assistance and training, have enabled greater diffusion 
of basic economic theories underlying antitrust enforcement in 
the US and the EU.93 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) and the International Competition 
Network have also provided important settings for voluntary co-
operation and diffusion of best practices, including economic analy-
sis of antitrust law. However, these networks have not fully em-
braced the Chicago School’s vision of antitrust law. Instead, they 
have endorsed a more expansive notion of antitrust enforcement 
while emphasizing the benefits of economic principles as a foun-
dation of sound antitrust policy. 
 
 
 
 
 89 Id at 397. 
 90 See Shozo Ota, Law and Economics in Japan: Hatching Stage, 11 Intl Rev L & 
Econ 301, 302 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Law and Economics in Japan, 2011 Ill L Rev 
1455, 1461. 
 91 See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of “Law & Economics”, 35 Cap U L Rev 
787, 797–803 (2007). 
 92 See Marquis, 28 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev L J at 176 (cited in note 71). 
 93 See id at 177 (noting that the first general bilateral agreements “enabled agencies 
to build a communicative infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, develop trust, 
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B. Why the Chicago School’s International Influence May Be 
Limited 
The growing popularity of law and economics in some juris-
dictions raises the question why the Chicago School has had a 
more limited international influence. One explanation is that the 
Chicago School never intended to have a global reach. Its creators 
and promoters were primarily focused on transforming American 
antitrust doctrine and lacked any self-conscious objective to 
spread its teachings abroad. Yet the absence of a “missionary 
agenda” likely also reflects the thin international antitrust land-
scape at the height of the Chicago School’s influence. Only forty-
one jurisdictions had adopted an antitrust law by 1979.94 Few 
likely predicted in the early 1970s that the world in 2019 would 
have over 130 jurisdictions with a domestic antitrust law or saw 
the extent to which the conduct of US corporations would be con-
strained by EU and other foreign antitrust regulators.95 Thus, 
there was no perceived need to internationalize the Chicago 
School ideas at the time. 
More recently, there has been a growing understanding in 
the United States of the globalization of antitrust law, which has 
led to a more concerted effort to export US-style antitrust laws 
and economics abroad. However, by the time the significant inter-
nationalization of antitrust law had become clear, the more co-
herent ideas of the Chicago School had given way to a more dif-
fuse set of economic ideologies, shaped by multiple different 
schools of thought. Thus, when the DOJ and the FTC began to 
engage with their foreign counterparts in earnest in the late 
1990s, their “export product” was a more diluted version of the 
Chicago School. In other words, the economic principles they en-
dorsed no longer followed the pure tenants of Chicago School 
ideas, and they instead embraced variations of Harvard School 
and post–Chicago School economics that had since become main-
stream in US antitrust thinking. 
Relatedly, what may also have compromised the direct influ-
ence of the Chicago School ideas is the lack of a scholarly consen-
sus over which facets of US antitrust law were actually influenced 
by them, as opposed to a hybrid Chicago-Harvard or post-Chicago 
ideas. If this was not clear in the United States, it was likely even 
less clear for any foreign jurisdiction looking to import ideas from 
 
 94 Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud at 417 (cited in note 11). 
 95 Id. 
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abroad. Any country seeking to emulate US antitrust policies 
hence was less likely to make the distinction among these vari-
ants of economic thinking, adopting some elements of each as op-
posed to any pure variant of the Chicago School. Further, even 
those elements were more likely adopted to fit the local needs and 
circumstances, further blending the theories that came to guide 
the various domestic antitrust laws. 
What may have further compromised the global diffusion of 
Chicago School ideas is that by the time most foreign jurisdictions 
adopted an antitrust law, they had an alternative antitrust model 
to follow and often preferred to turn to the EU antitrust laws in-
stead. While the United States has attempted to promote the “de-
velopment of sound antitrust laws” abroad,96 historically, the EU 
system has had more direct influence on countries seeking to im-
plement competition policies for the first time.97 There are several 
reasons for this, including that the EU actively promotes its 
model through preferential trade agreements and has an admin-
istrative template that is easy to emulate due to its relative stat-
utory precision.98 Former FTC Chairman William E. Kovacic sug-
gests that unlike the EU, the United States does not have the 
consolidated bargaining power to induce potential trade partners 
into adopting its antitrust models; it instead must persuade those 
jurisdictions that its experience and theories are superior.99 The 
United States’ attempts to emphasize the superiority of its policy, 
however, have rarely been successful. Indeed, we show elsewhere 
 
 96 Wendell L. Willkie II, Antitrust Goes International, 59 Antitrust L J 563, 563 (1991). 
 97 Anu Bradford, et al, The Global Dominance of European Competition Law over 
American Antitrust Law, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud 731, 739–40, 745 (2019) (examining 
126 countries’ first competition law adopted and finding that more countries have imple-
mented laws similar to the EU than to the US). 
 98 Id at 755, 759. See also William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future In-
fluence on Global Competition Policy, 22 Geo Mason L Rev 1157, 1157 (2015) (suggesting 
that “the compatibility of the EU’s antitrust institutions with civil law states that were 
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 99 See Kovacic, 22 Geo Mason L Rev at 1159–60 (cited in note 98). See also Marquis, 
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how the EU’s antitrust model eclipsed that of the US in the 1990s 
as the template for new antitrust jurisdictions.100 
However, the EU’s gradual adoption of economic analysis, in 
turn, may have contributed to the diffusion of the law and eco-
nomics movement around the world. Thus, the United States’ 
ideas of antitrust law and economics have most successfully dif-
fused only once the EU started to embrace and promote them as 
part of its own legal regime. Yet the EU never embraced a strong 
version of the Chicago School and has been hesitant to spread 
many of its principles. This partially explains why the variant of 
law and economics that has gained traction abroad is the variant 
embraced by the EU. As we show in the next Part, many jurisdic-
tions around the world continue to follow the EU’s lead in prohib-
iting a broad range of anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist 
and restricting many types of vertical agreements that the Chicago 
School considered per se procompetitive. However, by recognizing 
efficiency defenses and enforcing their laws against the bench-
marks of consumer welfare or efficiency, these jurisdictions also 
acknowledge the broader contours of law and economics as key to 
their antitrust policies. 
Even though the Chicago School’s international influence 
may be limited in practice, an argument could be made that the 
Chicago School’s philosophy would have served many foreign ju-
risdictions well. The Chicago School’s minimalist doctrine could 
well have been simpler for many jurisdictions to follow compared 
to the more nuanced analytical models associated with post–
Chicago School scholarship. This may be true in particular for 
countries with few resources and hence the ability to engage only 
in selective antitrust interventions. The inadequate economics 
training of many agencies and judges in some countries may 
make it difficult for those jurisdictions to pursue conduct when 
pro- and anticompetitive effects are difficult to separate. For ex-
ample, unilateral conduct, vertical agreements, and vertical mer-
gers are difficult to investigate as they often present complex 
trade-offs between pro- and anticompetitive effects. The narrow 
focus on hard-core cartels or horizontal mergers could therefore 
have presented a legitimate enforcement agenda that would have 
been more feasible to carry out. 
 
 100 Bradford, et al, J Empirical Legal Stud at 734 (cited in note 97). 
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Despite the advantage of the Chicago School’s narrow en-
forcement agenda, some jurisdictions may not have had the do-
mestic support for the strong promarket ideology that was asso-
ciated with the Chicago School. For instance, the markets in some 
developing countries were less robust and more prone to failure, 
inviting an antitrust agenda that was broader and more interven-
tionist. Also, public support for the pursuit of unilateral conduct 
by monopolies was high in many of the jurisdictions, in particular 
in economies where the state still controls many large enterprises 
or where privatization has merely shifted the ownership of large 
conglomerates from public to private hands. There was thus no 
fertile political economy ground for the Chicago School ideas in 
their pure forms to take hold. 
C. Why the Chicago School Influence Is Difficult to Test 
Testing the international influence of the Chicago School em-
pirically is difficult, which likely explains the few attempts to do 
so to date. As mentioned in the Introduction, our own attempt 
faces three important limitations: (1) the Chicago School is a com-
mitment to analytical methods rather than specific statutory pro-
visions or policy outcomes; (2) the Chicago School’s propositions 
are intertwined with the broader growth of the law and economics 
movement; and (3) our database reflects mostly antitrust statutes 
around the world, which may fail to capture subtleness in policy 
changes. While we do our best in this Essay to overcome these 
limitations, we readily acknowledge them. 
First, as we explained in Part I.B, the Chicago School was 
more of a commitment to deploy certain methods, like price the-
ory, to understand firm behavior than it was a specific substan-
tive philosophy. This means that even Chicago School scholars 
disagreed on policy outcomes.101 This creates two challenges: first, 
it allows us to, in theory, pick the most favorable results to our 
analysis and then justify them on some variation of the Chicago 
School; and second, the Chicago School methods normally lead to 
 
 101 For example, Judges Bork and Posner disagreed on how to treat predation claims, 
with Bork advocating an almost per se legality to predation and Posner affirming that it 
can be damaging in specific circumstances. Compare Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 154 (cited 
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most forms of firm behavior being evaluated under the rule of rea-
son—a process not always reflected in formal rules that form the 
core of our database. 
Second, some of the ideas associated with the Chicago School 
are somewhat intertwined with a more general use of economic 
analysis of law. This is a limitation that we cannot effectively ad-
dress. Therefore, the results below, to the extent they indicate a 
spread of the Chicago School, can be interpreted more broadly to 
capture the diffusion of economic analysis of antitrust laws gen-
erally as opposed to specific diffusion of the Chicago School’s 
ideas—although the Chicago School was a key driver behind the 
emergence and evolution of economic analysis of antitrust. 
Third, the data we deploy to study the Chicago School’s influ-
ence consists of comprehensive coding of the world’s antitrust 
statutes and selected aggregate information on enforcement ac-
tions taken by antitrust authorities around the world. To the ex-
tent that these laws and cases do not reflect the actual enforcement 
practice of a given country, our results may underestimate or over-
estimate the extent of the Chicago School’s global influence.102 
III.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
We are not aware of previous attempts to study empirically 
the international influence of the Chicago School. The goal of this 
study is therefore to explore the international influence of the 
Chicago School with the help of novel data. We first briefly intro-
duce our data on antitrust laws and enforcement around the 
world. We then examine whether countries’ antitrust regimes are 
consistent with Chicago School ideas in three ways: (1) the goals 
and exemptions they explicitly incorporate into their antitrust 
laws, (2) their regulation of unilateral conduct, and (3) their pro-
visions on the review of mergers. 
A. Data 
In order to test the international influence of the Chicago 
School, we use data that we recently collected as part of the Com-
parative Competition Law Project.103 We specifically draw from 
 
 102 An example is the Robinson-Patman Act in the United States, which is still on the 
books but rarely enforced by courts. See D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 
Geo Wash L Rev 2064, 2080 (2015). Our database would indicate that this law is against 
the teachings of the Chicago School, while actual enforcement data would say otherwise. 
 103 See generally Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical Legal Stud (cited in note 11). 
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two distinct datasets. Although these datasets both have limita-
tions, we believe they provide the most comprehensive picture 
currently available of antitrust regimes around the world. To pro-
vide a sense of their scope, Figure 2 shows the countries that are 
included in at least one of the datasets. 
FIGURE 2: COUNTRIES IN THE COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 
AND ENFORCEMENT DATASETS 
 
First, our data on antitrust laws is from the Comparative 
Competition Law Dataset.104 This dataset was constructed over a 
period of six years by employing a team of over seventy Columbia 
Law School students with relevant legal training and language 
skills.105 To construct the dataset, we first identified all the anti-
trust statues, relevant sector-specific regulations, and other laws 
that contained provisions related to regulating market competi-
tion that any jurisdiction with an antitrust regime had passed at 
any time prior to 2010. For each law, we had two coders complete 
a 171-part survey that documented relevant elements of the ju-
risdictions’ antitrust regime, including whether it, for example, 
prohibits resale price maintenance, provides for criminal sanc-
tions, or recognizes a public interest defense in merger reviews. We 
then had a third, more experienced, coder review discrepancies 
and create a final consensus coding for every antitrust provision. 
 
 104 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 415–24 (cited in note 11). 
 105 Id at 416. 
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In total, we coded 700 laws for 131 jurisdictions, including 126 
countries and 5 regional organizations.106 
These data focus on the antitrust laws codified in statutes. 
This may seem like a significant limitation from the US perspec-
tive as courts play a major role in the development of antitrust 
law in the US. However, this is not the case in most countries.107 
To confirm this, we conducted an expert survey of antitrust ex-
perts from around the world that asked about the role that courts 
play in the development of antitrust law.108 In total, 166 experts 
from 86 countries completed our survey. Of those countries, the 
experts responded that courts play a large or extensive role in the 
development of antitrust law in just twelve countries.109 As a re-
sult, for most countries, our coding of countries’ antitrust laws on 
the books should accurately capture the content of their antitrust 
regimes. 
Second, our data on antitrust enforcement is from the Com-
parative Competition Enforcement Dataset.110 This dataset was 
constructed over a period of five years by employing a team of over 
forty Columbia Law School and University of Chicago Law School 
students that also had relevant legal training and language skills. 
To construct this dataset, we identified jurisdictions with an an-
titrust agency in place any time between 1990 and 2010. We col-
lected publicly available information on variables such as the 
agencies’ resources (for example, staff and budget), investigations 
opened, and investigations closed with remedies. After reviewing 
all publicly available information for each agency, we then cre-
ated specifically tailored questionnaires that we sent directly to 
each agency to ask for more information on their enforcement ac-
tivities. Through this process, 103 agencies provided us with at 
least some data and, in total, we were able to collect at least some 
data from 112 agencies across 100 jurisdictions.111 
 
 106 Id at 417. There are four jurisdictions that we are aware of having an antitrust 
regime prior to 2010 for which we were unable to code: ASEAN, Djibouti, the Faroe Is-
lands, and Iran. Id at 413 n 4. 
 107 See id at 419. 
 108 For more information on the survey, see Anu Bradford and Adam S. Chilton, Trade 
Openness and Antitrust Law, 62 J L & Econ 29, 48–49 (2019). 
 109 Id. The twelve countries that received an average score of 4 or higher are: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id at 49 n 15. 
 110 For a more detailed explanation of this dataset, see Bradford, et al, 16 J Empirical 
Legal Stud at 424–37 (cited in note 11). 
 111 Id at 425–26. 
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B. Goals and Exemptions 
We begin by exploring the goals that countries explicitly state 
in their antitrust statutes. As previously noted, the Chicago School 
emphasizes that the appropriate goals of antitrust policy are re-
lated to efficiency. But instead of following Chicago School teach-
ings and stipulating that the goals of their antitrust regime are 
simply efficiency, consumer welfare, or total welfare (“Efficiency-
Related Goals”), some countries explicitly articulate goals aimed 
at broader industrial or social policy (“Non-Efficiency-Related 
Goals”). 
Figure 3 shows the proportion of countries with an antitrust 
law in place in a given year that articulated only Efficiency-
Related goals, only Non-Efficiency-Related Goals, both types of 
goals, or no explicit goals. It reveals that, through 1990, roughly 
70 percent of regimes did not explicitly stipulate any goals. After 
1990, there was an increase in the number of countries that ex-
plicitly stipulated exclusively Efficiency-Related Goals: by 2010, 
14 percent of countries had goals codified in their antitrust stat-
utes that were exclusively Efficiency-Related. However, even 
more countries adopted goals that were not purely related to effi-
ciency: by 2010, 16 percent of countries had goals codified in their 
antitrust statutes that were exclusively Non-Efficiency-Related 
and 33 percent of countries had goals codified in their antitrust 
statutes that were both Efficiency and Non-Efficiency Related. In 
other words, of the countries that stipulated goals in their anti-
trust statutes, just 22 percent focused exclusively on efficiency. 
Or put another way, contrary to the teachings of the Chicago 
School, 50 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had explic-
itly codified Non-Efficiency-Related Goals in their antitrust laws 
by 2010. 
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FIGURE 3: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY-RELATED GOALS IN 
ANTITRUST STATUTES 
In addition to rejecting the use of antitrust policy to advance 
goals unrelated to efficiency, the Chicago School unambiguously 
rejected the use of antitrust policy for protectionist ends or to ad-
vance industrial policy. Of course, countries are unlikely to ex-
plicitly stipulate that industrial policy is a goal of their antitrust 
law. Instead, if a country is using antitrust policy in pursuit of 
industrial policy, it is more likely to exempt categories of enter-
prises from the scope of its antitrust regime. 
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FIGURE 4: PREVALENCE OF ENTERPRISE EXEMPTIONS IN 
ANTITRUST STATUTES 
 
To test this, Figure 4 reports the proportion of countries with 
an antitrust law in place in a given year that provide complete 
exemptions to certain categories of enterprises.112 Panel A specif-
ically breaks out countries that include an explicit exemption for 
state-owned enterprises or state-operated enterprises. It makes 
clear that, while these exemptions are rare, they do exist. For in-
stance, by 2010, 7 percent of countries included them in their an-
titrust laws. Panel B breaks out countries that have other kinds 
of enterprise exemptions. These include, for example, designated 
monopolies or export cartels. Again, although the majority of 
countries do not include any of these complete exemptions in their 
antitrust regimes, they have remained common. In 1980, they 
were included in 41 percent of countries’ antitrust laws, and by 
2010, they were included in 37 percent of countries’ antitrust 
laws. In other words, although the proportion of countries has 
 
 112 Our dataset codes whether countries’ antitrust laws included either complete or 
partial enterprise exemptions. Figure 4, however, only graphs countries with complete en-
terprise exemptions. This is because, depending on the type and their rationale, partial 
exemptions may be consistent with the economic theories advanced by the Chicago School. 
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slightly decreased since the Chicago School emerged, over a third 
of countries with antitrust regimes have exempted entire catego-
ries of enterprises from the scope of those laws. 
FIGURE 5: PREVALENCE OF INDUSTRY EXEMPTIONS 
Finally, another way to examine if a country’s antitrust pol-
icy is used to pursue industrial policy is to examine if it exempts 
entire industries from the scope of its antitrust laws. Figure 5 re-
ports the proportion of countries with an antitrust law in place in 
a given year that exempt at least one industry entirely from the 
scope of their laws. Again, this trend has also notably increased 
over time, and the increase has been pronounced in the period 
after the height of the Chicago School in the 1970s. In 1950, 
26 percent of countries had an industry exemption; in 1990, 
49 percent of countries had an industry exemption; and by 2010, 
50 percent of countries exempted at least one industry from their 
antitrust regime. 
C. Unilateral Conduct 
One of the defining features of the Chicago School was its 
skepticism of the need to police unilateral conduct by monopolies. 
By emphasizing the importance of scale economies, the Chicago 
School often viewed large firms as efficient and argued that such 
firms’ unilateral actions likely improved consumer welfare. As a 
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result, antitrust authorities should refrain from challenging var-
ious types of unilateral conduct that traditional antitrust law had 
condemned as anticompetitive. As Figure 6 shows, however, 
many countries’ antitrust laws continued to directly address a 
range of unilateral conduct. Notably, in 2010, 63 percent of coun-
tries with antitrust regimes included provisions prohibiting un-
fair pricing, while 72 percent prohibited discriminatory pricing. 
Figure 6 thus suggests that many countries that passed laws af-
ter the Chicago School’s peak of influence in the United States 
continued to draft laws that prohibited conduct that Chicago 
School scholars argued was unlikely to reduce efficiency. In addi-
tion, the data show that only 37 percent of countries allowed effi-
ciency defenses in unilateral conduct investigations—a Chicago 
School scholar would argue that efficiency defenses should be al-
lowed in all unilateral cases. On the other hand, 24 percent of 
countries allowed a public interest defense, something that falls 
clearly outside of the Chicago School framework. 
FIGURE 6: PREVALENCE OF PROHIBITIONS ON UNILATERAL 
CONDUCT 
 
Chicago School philosophy would suggest that cartel enforce-
ment should be the focus of antitrust policy whereas few resources 
should be dedicated to challenge unilateral conduct. To examine 
326 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:297 
 
whether countries have followed this philosophy, Figure 7 com-
pares enforcement activities for both cartel and unilateral con-
duct cases from countries around the world from 1990 to 2010. 
Contrary to the Chicago School ideas, Figure 7 suggests that, 
around the world between 1990 and 2010, the agencies that re-
ported their activities carried out considerably more unilateral 
conduct investigations than cartel investigations. For instance, in 
2010, there were 1,495 cartel investigations and 4,128 abuse of 
dominance investigations around the world. The same story 
emerges for investigations that were actually closed with reme-
dies. In 2010, there were 388 cartel investigations that were 
closed with fine or other remedies, which is a small number com-
pared to the 1,617 abuse of dominance investigations that were 
closed with remedies. 
FIGURE 7: COMPARING THE ENFORCEMENT AGAINST CARTELS 
AND UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
That said, the enforcement data behind Figure 7 have limita-
tions. Notably, the total number of investigations and remedies 
are likely undercounted because not all agencies reported their 
data. Moreover, these data count all investigations as equal, and 
thus do not tell us anything about the amount of resources that 
were dedicated to each investigation. For instance, it is possible 
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that the unilateral conduct investigations were small while the 
cartel investigations were more substantial. Finally, an ex-
tremely large percentage of the abuse of dominance investiga-
tions were initiated by a single country: Russia. In 2010, for ex-
ample, Russia initiated 66 percent of the world’s abuse of 
dominance investigations (2,736 out of 4,128 total). In 2010, Russia 
also was responsible for an astounding 90 percent of the world’s 
abuse of dominance investigations closed with remedies (1,453 
out of 1,617 total). In comparison, Russia was responsible for 
41 percent (607 out of 1,495 total) of the world’s cartel investiga-
tions in 2010 and for 52 percent (393 out of 756 total) of the 
world’s cartel cases closed with remedies in 2009 (Russia did not 
provide data on cartel investigations closed with remedies for 
2010). There are several reasons for Russia’s distinct enforcement 
pattern, including that the Russian agency also uses antitrust 
law to curb inflation and to control prices.113 Although Russia was 
the world leader of abuse of dominance cases, even excluding 
Russia, the rest of the world still opened more abuse of dominance 
investigations than cartel investigations in 2010. This provides at 
least some evidence that countries have ignored the Chicago 
School teachings according to which unilateral conduct should 
rarely be the focus of antitrust enforcement. 
D. Merger Review 
As previously explained, another area in which the Chicago 
School was critical of existing antitrust doctrine was merger re-
view. Indeed, as seen above, Judge Bork scolded the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Brown Shoe Co, Inc v United States and 
United States v Von’s Grocery Co, and affirmed the primacy of al-
locative efficiency as the core criterion to evaluate a transaction 
among two competitors.  
Therefore, another way to indirectly assess the influence of 
the Chicago School is to look at the types of defenses that compa-
nies can invoke when confronted with a challenge to their pro-
posed transaction. The existence of an efficiency defense in a ju-
risdiction recognizes the procompetitive benefits of mergers and 
is therefore very much in line with the Chicago School’s teachings. 
The opposite is true if countries allow for other non-efficiency-
related public policy considerations to inform merger review. 
 
 113 OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 2011 *81 (OECD, Dec 2011), ar-
chived at https://perma.cc/WF7J-YL23. 
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FIGURE 8: PREVALENCE OF EFFICIENCY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
MERGER DEFENSES 
Figure 8 graphs the prevalence of merger defenses in anti-
trust regimes around the world from 1950 to 2010. More specifi-
cally, for countries with an antitrust statute, it shows the share 
of countries that had an efficiency defense, a public interest de-
fense, both defenses, or neither defense. Notably, the share of 
countries with explicit defenses in their statutes has increased 
over time. By 2010, only 36 percent of countries had neither effi-
ciency nor public interest defenses. Instead, 22 percent of coun-
tries had only efficiency defenses, 8 percent had only public inter-
est defenses, and 34 percent of countries had both efficiency and 
public interest defenses. Taken together, Figure 8 reveals that 
42 percent of countries with antitrust regimes had adopted mer-
ger defenses unrelated to efficiency reasons by 2010—in opposi-
tion to the Chicago School’s teachings. 
CONCLUSION 
Judges Posner and Bork published their treatises more than 
forty years ago, marking one of the high points of decades of in-
tellectual work by scholars associated with the University of 
Chicago. Since then, antitrust policy has undergone a revolution: 
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US antitrust enforcement changed significantly, reflecting many 
of the teachings of the Chicago School. In the decades that fol-
lowed, antitrust regimes around the world also multiplied. How-
ever, despite the Chicago School’s vast influence in the United 
States, the evidence we have presented in this Essay suggests 
that the Chicago School’s international penetration was less per-
vasive than many would imagine. 
More recently, as public attention in the United States has 
begun to focus on increased market concentration, lessening com-
petition, and rising economic inequality,114 the US Congress and 
enforcement agencies are facing mounting calls to strengthen the 
antitrust laws and their enforcement. Many influential scholars 
are arguing that the United States needs to rethink its approach 
to antitrust policy,115 with some specifically blaming the Chicago 
School for providing the intellectual foundation for the lax US an-
titrust enforcement of the past decades.116 While our research 
does not directly address whether the Chicago School was too le-
nient on large corporations, or whether and how US antitrust pol-
icy should be reformed, our data provide a more nuanced view of 
the Chicago School’s global reach. It also suggests that, if the 
United States wants to reevaluate many of the core Chicago 
School teachings and reinvigorate its antitrust enforcement, it 
has many examples around the world to turn to. 
 
 114 See World Economic Outlook: Growth Slowdown, Precarious Recovery *56–58 
(IMF, Apr 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/AL4Z-THLV (studying almost one million 
firms to answer questions regarding market power, its effect on income distribution, and 
whether market competition needs to be strengthened). 
 115 See, for example, Jonathan B. Baker, The Antitrust Paradigm: Restoring a Com-
petitive Economy 2–7 (Harvard 2019); Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton, and E. Glen 
Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Anti-
trust L J 669, 669–70 (2017); Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, and Glen Weyl, Antitrust 
Remedies for Labor Market Power, 132 Harv L Rev 536, 547–49 (2018) (arguing that FTC 
and DOJ should enforce antitrust laws more often in labor market concentration cases). 
 116 See, for example, Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L J 710, 
717–37 (2017); Maurice E. Stucke and Marshall Steinbaum, The Effective Competition 
Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust, 87 U Chi L Rev 595, 597–601 (2020). 
